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Review Essay 
ABSTRACT DEMOCRACY: A REVIEW OF 
ACKERMAN'S WE THE PEOPLE 
Terrance Sandalow t 
We the People: Foundations. By Bruce Ackerman.2 Cam-
bridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 
1991. Pp. x, 369. Cloth, $24.95 
We the People: Foundations is an ambitious book, the first of 
three volumes in which Professor Ackerman proposes to recast con-
ventional understanding of and contemporary debate about Ameri-
can constitutional law. Unfortunately, the book's rhetoric-
inflated, self-important, and self-congratulatory-impedes the effort 
to come to terms with its argument. How, for example, does one 
respond to a book that opens by asking whether the reader will have 
"the strength" to accept its thesis? Or that announces the author's 
intention of "engaging" two of the most influential works of intel-
lectual history of the past several decades-and then discusses one 
in two and one-half pages and the other in one and one-half? 
Despite its off-putting rhetoric, We the People is an interesting, 
often provocative, and potentially influential book. One cannot help 
but admire its ambition, the breadth of knowledge that informs it, 
and many of its insights and arguments. I suspect that many stu-
dents of constitutional law will conclude that Ackerman's thesis 
provides an attractive framework within which to address constitu-
tional issues. That prediction, however, has less to do with the per-
suasiveness of the thesis than with the opportunities it creates for 
employing the Constitution creatively to address a broad range of 
social and political issues.3 
I. Edson R. Sunderland Professor of Law, The University of Michigan. I am grateful 
for the helpful comments of my colleague Larry Kramer. 
2. Sterling Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale University. 
3. The current composition of the Court may, of course, diminish the enthusiasm of 
some for employing the Constitution that way. But then, it may increase the enthusiasm of 
others. 
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I 
The fulcrum of Ackerman's thesis is the problem of constitu-
tional change. As the twentieth century closes, Americans live 
under a governmental regime vastly different from the one contem-
plated by the founding generation. Congress, originally and still in 
theory limited to the exercise of enumerated powers, has for all 
practical purposes become the legislature of a unitary nation. The 
President exercises power far more extensive than can plausibly be 
brought within the founding generation's understanding of the "ex-
ecutive power" conferred by Article II. The Supreme Court, Ham-
ilton's "least dangerous" branch,4 has emerged as a major 
policymaking institution, exercising power that the framers would 
not have recognized as being "of a Judiciary Nature."s Extensive 
authority is vested in "independent agencies," a "fourth branch" of 
government that not only does not fit comfortably within the tripar-
tite system established by the Constitution, but which, in combining 
legislative, executive, and judicial functions, exercises power in a 
manner that Madison labelled "the very definition of tyranny."6 
As the power of the national government and each of its 
branches has grown, the autonomy of the states has contracted, per-
haps to the vanishing point. Originally understood to be the con-
stituent governments of a federal system, the states now occupy a 
constitutional position not markedly different from that of local 
governments in a unitary nation. Federal law displaces state law on 
an ever-widening range of subjects as citizens increasingly look to 
the federal government to address any and all issues thought to re-
quire the attention of government. Within the areas of the states' 
competence, moreover, federal law significantly influences and often 
determines the policies they adopt, the procedures they follow, their 
internal organization, and even their political structure. And to 
assure their compliance with federal law and policy, they are subject 
to the supervisory authority of a large federal bureaucracy and the 
federal courts. 
The "problem of constitutional change" is that these altera-
tions in the structure of government cannot be accounted for by the 
mechanisms of change provided by the Constitution. Article V em-
bodies the framers' understanding that with the passage of time 
changes would be required in the constitutional plan. Consonant 
4. Federalist No. 78 (Hamilton) in Jacob E. Cooke, ed., The Federalist 521, 522 (Wes-
leyan U. Press, 1961). 
5. Max Farrand, ed., 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 430 (Yale U. 
Press, 1911). 
6. Federalist No. 47 (Madison) in Cooke, ed., The Federalist at 324 (cited in note 2). 
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with their understanding of the most fundamental feature of the 
governmental system they were creating, the mechanisms they pro-
vided for achieving such changes required the participation of the 
states: The Constitution might be altered only if three-fourths of 
the states consented. As Ackerman argues, it hasn't worked out 
that way. 
Two illustrations, both involving constitutional provisions that 
have been important vehicles for redistributing power from the 
states to the nation, suffice to make the point. Ackerman main-
tains-rightly in my view-that the commerce clause, even as ex-
pansively interpreted by Marshall, will not do all the work required 
to justify the federal government's plenary authority over the econ-
omy. The early understanding of that clause was embedded in the 
further understanding that federal power over interstate and foreign 
commerce would leave large areas of economic activity within the 
exclusive control of the states, thereby allowing them to serve as 
important sources of countervailing power. The Supreme Court's 
attempt during the early decades of the twentieth century to confine 
federal authority over the economy was not the product of willful-
ness nor of its failure to appreciate the realities of modern economic 
life, but a reasonable effort to carry forward the framers' under-
standing that authority to regulate economic activity would be di-
vided between the nation and the states.7 The collapse of that effort 
and the ensuing assumption of national responsibility for the eco-
nomic life of the country represents a major departure from the 
original constitutional plan, one that most of us fully accept, but it 
was achieved, significantly, without the participation of the states 
contemplated by Article V. 
Though the mechanism of change was different, essentially the 
same is true of another important vehicle for the expansion of fed-
eral power, the fourteenth amendment. Controversy over the 
amendment has for many years focused upon questions about how 
it should be interpreted, but Ackerman usefully directs attention to 
a quite different issue that it raises. The amendment, like the less 
formal "amendment" that permitted the federal government to as-
sume responsibility for management of the national economy, was 
adopted without the participation of the states contemplated by Ar-
ticle V. As Ackerman reminds us, the "consent" of the states to the 
adoption of the amendment was purely formal: The necessary as-
sent of the Southern states was obtained by means that deprived 
7. See Terrance Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 1033, 1048 
(1981); Terrance Sandalow, The Expansion of Federal Legislative Authority in Terrance 
Sandalow and Eric Stein, eds., Courts and Free Markets 49, 65 (Clarendon, 1982). 
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them of the opportunity for independent judgment implicit in the 
requirement that three-fourths of the states join in approving any 
amendment to the Constitution. In effect, Congress nationalized 
the process of constitutional amendment. s 
These and other departures from the original constitutional de-
sign that have been achieved without regard to Article V are now so 
deeply embedded in our "working constitution" that it may seem 
quixotic to raise questions about their legitimacy. The question of 
legitimacy is, however, of more than academic interest. Ackerman 
is right to emphasize that the absence of a satisfactory theory-one 
that recognizes and justifies the realities of constitutional change-
has a corrosive effect on the commitment to constitutionalism. 
And, as his argument also suggests, the theory by which past consti-
tutional change is understood is likely to exert a shaping influence 
upon the means by which constitutional change is sought in the 
future. 
Ackerman addresses the problem of constitutional change by 
embedding it within a comprehensive theory of the American con-
stitutional experience, one that seeks to explain and justify the 
workings of American democracy and the institutions through 
which it is given expression. Briefly stated, he argues that our con-
stitutional tradition distinguishes between "constitutional" and 
"normal" politics, between decisions made by "the People" -a civi-
cally aroused electorate-and those made by the government. 
Building upon ideas widely held when the Constitution was 
adopted, he maintains that only the former are entitled to constitu-
tional status. Instances of such "higher lawmaking" are necessarily 
infrequent because, as the framers understood, in a liberal democ-
racy the mass of citizens cannot be expected to be continuously at-
tentive to politics, much less to deliberate about the issues of 
principle that are the subject matter of constitutional politics. Their 
attention is, inevitably and desirably, mainly directed elsewhere-to 
their work, to their families and friends, and to religious and cul-
tural activities, "all weaving together to form the remarkable patch-
work of American community life." A diminished sense of civic 
responsibility is "the price we pay for freedom-freedom to explore 
the depth and breadth of the human spirit; freedom to live within 
one of the countless frameworks of meaning opened up by the mod-
em world." (306) 
During the long periods of civic slumber, when most citizens 
are relatively inattentive to public affairs, government must none-
8. See also Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 Yale L. J. 
453, 500-10 (1989). 
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theless go on. Important decisions must be made. Interest 
groups-motivated by a desire for private advantage, by ideals, or 
by some mixture of the two-inevitably attempt to influence those 
decisions. But though periodic elections provide a measure of ac-
countability to the citizenry, the People-the mobilized mass of citi-
zens seriously engaged in deliberating about the principles that 
should guide the operation of their government-are not present at 
these times. Because they are not, the ever-present claims of gov-
ernment officials and interest groups who purport to speak on their 
behalf must be rejected. Decisions taken by government during 
these periods of civic somnolence must, instead, respect the princi-
ples established by the People when they have spoken. 
From time to time, the People do arise, responding to argu-
ments that some fundamental change in the constitutional order is 
required. Politics during these periods is marked not only by in-
creased public attention to and more serious deliberation about the 
affairs of government, but by enhanced public-spiritedness, a greater 
willingness on the part of citizens to put aside their personal inter-
ests in the pursuit of the public interest. The obvious question is 
how one knows when the People have accepted the argument for 
constitutional change. One lesson of our history, Ackerman re-
sponds, is that the People are not limited by a requirement that they 
express their will through established legal forms. The People did 
not respect the procedures established by the Articles of Confedera-
tion when they adopted the Constitution, nor did they comply with 
Article V when they approved the constitutional changes wrought 
during what he regards as the other great "transformative mo-
ments" in American history, Reconstruction and the New Deal. 
Just as the founding generation invented constitutional conventions 
as a means of eliciting the People's will, subsequent generations 
found other irregular means for ascertaining whether the People 
would approve major changes in the constitutional order. 
With respect to the latter, Ackerman imaginatively develops 
striking parallels between the adoption of the fourteenth amend-
ment and the "ratification" of the constitutional changes that, as he 
views it, were accomplished by the New Deal. Briefly, he argues 
that in both instances the separation of powers in the national gov-
ernment substituted for Article V as a means of bringing to the Peo-
ple the question whether the existing Constitution should be 
fundamentally altered. In each instance, part of the government-
Congress in the earlier, the President and Congress in the later-
proposed measures inconsistent with the received understanding of 
the Constitution, measures that were resisted by another branch-
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the President in the earlier, the Supreme Court in the later. On 
each occasion, the resulting impasse led those proposing change to 
take the issue to the country at the next election, and at both elec-
tions the People overwhelmingly voted for the proponents. Armed 
with a mandate from the People, the proponents returned to do bat-
tle with the conservative branches, threatening the President with 
removal from office and the Supreme Court with "packing." In 
each instance, the conservative branch then acquiesced, thereby 
completing the process of constitutional change. 
These "transformative moments" -the founding, Reconstruc-
tion, and the New Deal-provide the framework for Ackerman's 
interpretation of constitutional history, dividing it into three dis-
tinct "constitutional regimes," which he defines as "the matrix of 
institutional relationships and fundamental values that are usually 
taken as the Constitutional baseline in normal political life." (59) 
The "early republic," which lasted from the founding to Recon-
struction, was characterized mainly by decentralization and a con-
gressionally led federal government. During the "middle republic," 
from Reconstruction to the New Deal, the federal government took 
on new importance as the guarantor of individual rights, especially 
rights of contract and property, against incursion by the states. De-
spite the federal government's growing power, however, its author-
ity over the national economy remained problematic. With the 
New Deal, we enter the "modem republic," a period marked by a 
"truly national" federal government, a "plebiscitary presidency," a 
repudiation of the previous regime's commitment to laissez-faire, 
and-as a consequence of the latter-a redefinition of the rights 
warranting federal protection. Widespread acceptance, even expec-
tation, of governmental intervention in the economy requires, as a 
corollary, significantly reduced protection for property and con-
tract, but the nation's continuing commitment to individual free-
dom has led to a new emphasis on other rights. Among them are 
some that protect interests previously shielded from government by 
contract and property rights. Others are concerned with safeguard-
ing opportunities to participate in and benefit from government, in-
terests that have taken on new importance in an era in which 
government has replaced the market as the central organizing insti-
tution of the society. 
Though Ackerman's account of constitutional history is far too 
schematic, his description of the three "constitutional regimes" 
nicely captures important tendencies in each of the periods. His 
argument in this respect is, however, a good deal less bold and revi-
sionist than he supposes it to be. Nearly all students of constitu-
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tional history would recognize that the Reconstruction amendments 
and the New Deal were constitutional turning points and, were they 
willing to paint with as broad a brush, accept something akin to 
Ackerman's characterization of the three periods. The arresting 
features of his thesis lie elsewhere, in his related claims that "[t]he 
basic unit of [constitutional] analysis should be the constitutional 
regime" (59) and that the characteristics of the three regimes are the 
product of decisions made by the People. Ackerman thus draws 
attention away from such conventional sources of constitutional 
judgment as the text and Supreme Court opinions. The task of con-
stitutional interpretation, he argues, is to give content to decisions 
made by the People on those occasions when they have spoken, 
whether or not they have embodied their will in amendments 
adopted pursuant to the procedures prescribed by Article V. The 
Supreme Court, to which the task primarily falls, thus serves a 
''preservationist function": "[I]ts job is to preserve the higher law 
solutions reached by the People against their erosion during periods 
of normal politics." (60) 
II 
Although Ackerman's thesis, which he labels "dualist democ-
racy," is richly elaborated and defended in the present volume, im-
portant elements of the supporting argument and a full 
development of the implications of the thesis are deferred to subse-
quent volumes. A final appraisal of the project must await the pub-
lication of those volumes. Some preliminary observations may 
nonetheless be in order. 
Ackerman's thesis is certain to be rejected out of hand by 
"originalists" of every stripe. Though originalist theories have pro-
liferated in recent years, all share a common premise, that constitu-
tional law should be confined by principles that can be derived from 
the written Constitution. A major difficulty with all such theories is 
that they fail to describe either our constitutional history or the cur-
rent content of constitutional law. The adoption of the fourteenth 
amendment and the federal government's assumption of plenary 
legislative power are especially vivid illustrations of that failure, but 
others, of varying significance, are no less familiar.9 Originalists 
can meet that difficulty only by reading the document at a very high 
level of abstraction, one that makes room for the judgments of suc-
ceeding generations and thereby accounts for a constitutional his-
tory that demonstrates the ability of successive generations to shape 
9. See, e.g., Sandalow, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 1033 (cited in note 7); Thomas C. Grey, Do 
We Have A Unwritten Constitution?, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 703 (1975). 
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constitutional law to their perception of their needs. Reading the 
Constitution in that way, however, sacrifices the point of the 
originalist project, z:e., to confine contemporary judgment by the 
historical document. As constitutional law increasingly bears the 
imprint of judgments subsequent to the adoption of the Constitu-
tion, the most that can be said is that the law we ascribe to the 
Constitution can be traced to the document-which is not quite the 
same as saying that it can be derived from the document. 
Of course, originalists might respond, as some do, that the fail-
ure of constitutional law to conform to their theory does not im-
pugn the theory; rather, it calls into question the legitimacy of what 
we call constitutional law. It is far from evident, however, why a 
theory so lacking in explanatory power should be of interest. In the 
large, constitutional law is an important repository of our national 
experience. It reflects not only the lessons gained over the course of 
two centuries about the means by which a written constitution can 
accommodate changing social circumstances and values, but the 
judgments of successive generations about the appropriate role of 
government in our society and the responsibilities of the several in-
stitutions of government for achieving successful performance of 
that role. A theory that calls for massive repudiation of that experi-
ence is unlikely to exert an important influence on our constitu-
tional future. Nor should it. Successful social institutions and 
practices-hence, the institutions and practices of a successful gov-
ernment-are not the product of a comprehensive plan or deriva-
tions from one or another abstract theory. They evolve over time, 
as existing institutions and practices are employed, and in the pro-
cess transformed, to fashion solutions to emerging problems and to 
accommodate changing values. 
Ackerman seems to me quite right, therefore, in urging that 
the Constitution is "best understood," not as a document, but "as a 
historically rooted tradition of theory and practice." (22) Although 
the fact is generally not recognized in the conventional language of 
constitutional discourse, we have returned to an earlier conception 
of the Constitution-one that retains currency when, for example, 
we refer to the British constitution-as the (evolving) set of institu-
tions and practices, together with the principles that undergird 
them, that define the major features of the governmental system. 10 
A candid acknowledgement that we have returned to that concep-
tion of the Constitution has the potential of significantly enriching 
our understanding of constitutional law, drawing attention to insti-
10. See Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 259-68 
(U. North Carolina Press, 1969). 
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tutions other than the Supreme Court as agents of constitutional 
change, to processes other than adjudication as vehicles of change, 
and to markers of change other than Supreme Court opinions. 1 I 
An awareness of the importance of these other actors and processes 
may, in turn, suggest important sources of constitutional judgment 
when courts are called upon to interpret the Constitution. 
We The People develops both possibilities, and in doing so 
demonstrates that an imaginative engagement with history offers a 
fruitful alternative to, on the one hand, the formalism that insists on 
rooting all of constitutional law in the written Constitution and, on 
the other, theories that Ackerman labels "foundationalist," those 
that, in whatever guise, aim to shape constitutional law to some 
transcendent moral or political theory. Like Holmes in Missouri v. 
Holland, Ackerman seeks to understand the contemporary meaning 
of the Constitution by asking, through time, "what this country has 
become."I2 His survey of history yields a number of important in-
sights, initially by drawing attention to features of the constitutional 
landscape that heretofore have received inadequate attention and, 
secondly, by stressing the importance of the "constitutional regime" 
both as an aid to understanding our constitutional past and as a 
source of contemporary constitutional judgment. 
We The People thus makes a number of important contribu-
tions to our understanding of constitutional law. None, however, is 
integral to nor a product of Ackerman's central thesis, "dualist de-
mocracy." The persuasive portions of his argument might be ac-
commodated, at least equally well, within an evolutionary theory of 
constitutional change, one that regards it as the product of a process 
characterized by a more complex and less episodic set of interac-
tions among governmental institutions and between those institu-
tions and the citizenry. Indeed, one might suppose that such a 
theory would better fit Ackerman's conception of the Constitution 
"as a historically rooted tradition of theory and practice." Never-
theless, he expressly rejects what he labels a "Burkean" approach to 
constitutional change, arguing that it fails to recognize the impor-
tance of the defining characteristics of "dualist democracy," higher 
lawmaking by the People and the need "to prevent normal govern-
ment from departing from the great principles of higher law vali-
dated by the People during their relatively rare successes in 
constitutional politics." (21) His argument in support of "dualist 
democracy" is, however, beset by difficulties sufficiently serious that 
II. The references, obviously, are to constitutional change that is not the product of 
formal amendments of the document. 
12. 252 u.s. 416, 434 (1920). 
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they raise doubts, even at this early stage of the project, whether it 
offers a useful framework for understanding our constitutional past 
or thinking about our constitutional future. The difficulties can 
conveniently be brought together under two major headings: first, 
those that are raised by Ackerman's arguments concerning the role 
of the People in "higher lawmaking" and, second, those that involve 
the role he assigns the Supreme Court during periods of "normal 
politics." 
III 
Begin with the adoption of the fourteenth amendment. Acker-
man, it will be recalled, maintains that the process by which it was 
ratified cannot be squared with the command of Article V, arguing 
that the amendment's legitimacy depends, instead, on the election 
of 1866, at which "We the People demanded a reconstructed Union 
on the basis of the Fourteenth Amendment."D The difficulty is that 
the same history that calls compliance with Article V into question 
is inconsistent with the contention that the 1866 election expressed 
the will of the People. The proposed amendment was, to be sure, a 
central issue in the campaign, and the election did produce an over-
whelmingly Republican Congress, significantiy strengthening the 
hand of the amendment's proponents. But the Congress did not 
include representatives from the Southern states, and it is all but 
certain that the ratification process would have played out quite dif-
ferently if it had. To hear the voice of the People in these circum-
stances is to indulge in a fiction that differs hardly at all from that 
employed by Congress in achieving ratification under Article V. It 
is, moreover, a dangerous fiction. Too many dark chapters in his-
tory provide evidence that those who purport to speak on behalf of 
the People tend to include in that august body count only those who 
share their commitments. Whatever good may have come of it, Re-
construction is merely one more illustration of that principle. Thus, 
as Ackerman wrote in an earlier article, apparently without irony, 
"[s]o far as Congressional Republicans were concerned, [admitting 
Southern representatives to the Congress] would only stifle the 
voice of the People."t4 
Difficulties in hearing the voice of the People at the 1866 elec-
tion-or at least in understanding what they said-persist even if 
the People are understood to include only citizens of the Northern 
13. Ackerman, 99 Yale L. J. at 507 (cited in note 8). 
14. Bruce Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 Yale L. J. 
1013, 1067 (1984). 
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states. Is Ackerman interprets the election results as expressing the 
People's decision that the federal government should henceforth act 
as guarantor of the rights of individuals against the states. In effect, 
he treats the election as a referendum on the principles enunciated 
in section I of the proposed amendment. Elections are, however, 
complex events whose outcome is influenced by a wealth of fac-
tors-including, typically, a range of issues, the personal qualities of 
the candidates, and at times accident. Discerning the voice of the 
People-the deliberate, public-spirited judgment that, for Acker-
man, emerges from "constitutional politics"--on any particular is-
sue thus poses formidable problems. The 1866 election is no 
exception. 
Among the factors contributing to the Republican victory was 
the public's strongly adverse reaction to President Johnson during 
his notorious "swing around the circle" to enlist popular support 
for his policies and his political allies. By one contemporary esti-
mate, he cost his supporters a million Northern votes. Johnson, 
however, never mentioned the fourteenth amendment. The adverse 
public reaction appears to have been largely attributable to personal 
qualities he revealed during the campaign and to his repeated de-
fense of the loyalty of the white South.I6 Public attitudes toward 
political leaders are, no doubt, always at least partly responsible for 
the public's response to the policies leaders propose, but in these 
circumstances it requires a rather large leap to translate adverse 
public reaction to Johnson into popular approval of a major shift in 
the balance of power between the nation and the states. Johnson's 
impact on the outcome of the election seems, rather, to point in the 
opposite direction, as an obstacle to interpreting the election results 
in that way. 
Despite Johnson's silence, historians generally agree that the 
15. To understand "the People"' in that way would, of course, be inconsistent with the 
North's insistence that the Southern states had never left the Union. More significantly, for 
present purposes, it would obviate the need to find a source of legitimacy for the fourteenth 
amendment outside Article V. Three-fourths of the Northern states had ratified the amend-
ment no later than June 15, 1867. See U.S.C.A. Amend. 14, Historical Notes. 
16. See Eric Foner, Reconstruction 264-66 (Harper & Row, 1988). In an earlier article, 
Ackerman describes Johnson as "railroading around the country ... to call upon the People 
to repudiate the proposed Fourteenth Amendment by returning solid conservatives to Con-
gress." Ackerman, 99 Yale L. J. at 505 (cited in note 8). The sources he cites do not support 
that claim. Indeed, his primary citation states precisely the opposite, asserting, as I have 
stated in the text, that Johnson "never mentioned the Fourteenth Amendment." Foner, Re-
construction at 265. The other sources upon which he relies do not discuss the point, 
stressing instead the adverse public reaction to Johnson's personal characteristics, Eric C. 
McKitrick, Andrew Johnson and Reconstruction 428-38 (U. Chi. Press, 1960), and disagree-
ment about the terms on which representatives from Southern states should be admitted to 
Congress, Michael Les Benedict, A Compromise of Principle 188-209, esp. at 202-03 (W.W. 
Norton. 1974). 
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fourteenth amendment was a major issue in the election. Still, it 
ought not be too quickly assumed that section 1, the only provision 
of the amendment to receive sustained attention from subsequent 
generations, had a similar centrality in 1866. To be sure, the Black 
Codes and other repressive measures tending to maintain the freed-
men in a state of near-servitude had outraged many Northerners, 
and there was, no doubt, widespread sentiment that the nation bore 
responsibility for protecting the freedmen. Whether that sentiment 
was the moving force behind Northern support for the amendment 
or even whether it reflected a consensus of Northern voters is more 
difficult to say because the amendment also addressed other issues. 
The election, it hardly needs stating, came at the end of a pro-
tracted and bitter war, one that had aroused intense feelings of na-
tional identity in the North. Strong sentiments demanded 
assurance that the South had acquiesced in its defeat and had ac-
cepted the indestructibility of the nation. Yet, mounting evidence 
suggested the opposite, that Presidential Reconstruction was en-
abling the South to wrench victory from its defeat. In many parts 
of the South, the "reconstructed" governments were led by mem-
bers of the Confederate establishment that had sought to destroy 
the Union, men whose loyalty to the nation was doubted, whatever 
oaths they might be willing to take. Those with whom the North 
identified, Southern Unionists and Northerners who had gone 
South, were excluded and, worse, were not even secure in their per-
son and property. The ascendancy of Confederate loyalists even 
threatened continued control of Congress by the Republicans, 11 the 
party that had led the nation to victory in war and was associated 
with the new sense of national identity.Is 
Sections 2 and 3 of the amendment addressed precisely these 
concerns. The latter, by denying state or federal office to any per-
son who had taken the constitutional oath and later participated in 
the rebellion, both exacted retribution from traitors and seemed to 
offer at least the potential for new political leadership in the South. 
The former, by reducing the representation in the House of states 
that denied blacks the right to vote, sought to ensure either that 
Southern blacks, who might be expected to vote Republican, would 
be able to influence Southern politics toward the election of loyal 
officials or, if the vote were denied, that at least Southern influence 
in the House and the electoral college would be reduced. 
17. With the end of slavery, Southern influence in the House and in the electoral college 
would have been increased because of the lapse of three-fifths clause of Article I, section 2. 
18. See Foner, Reconstruction at 216-27 (cited in note 16); William E. Nelson, The 
Fourteenth Amendment 40-47 (Harv. U. Press, 1988). 
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The emotional intensity of the issues addressed by these provi-
sions strongly suggests that they were an important influence on 
Northern support for the amendment, further complicating the task 
of interpreting the election results. Since Ackerman has deferred a 
full account of his investigation of the events leading to the adop-
tion of the amendment to a subsequent volume, it would be prema-
ture to dismiss the possibility that he can, despite the other 
influences at work, adduce persuasive evidence that the election 
should be interpreted as, in effect, a (Northern) referendum on sec-
tion I. The preview of his argument in a recent article, however, 
contains no hint he is aware of the difficulty of the task.I9 
Similar difficulties are, in any event, all but certain to arise 
whenever a claim is made that an election should be treated as a 
referendum. Ackerman, for example, once again hears the voice of 
the People in the 1964 election, which he interprets as expressing 
their "considered judgment about civil rights." (110) Though he 
does not describe that judgment, scattered references throughout 
the book suggest that he interprets the election as an endorsement 
of the civil rights movement's goal of racial equality. The struggle 
for racial equality was, of course, the great domestic issue of the 
1960s and doubtless a salient, even though a muted, issue during the 
presidential campaign. The candidates had secretly agreed to avoid 
emotional appeals concerning the issue, and each addressed it in 
only one major speech during the campaign. Nevertheless, Presi-
dent Johnson had supported, while his opponent, Senator Goldwa-
ter, had voted against the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a well-known 
difference in their positions that, on balance, probably benefitted 
Johnson. But Johnson's crushing defeat of Goldwater owed much, 
and almost certainly more, to a host of other factors-the fears that 
Goldwater would increase American involvement in Vietnam and 
that he could not be trusted with command of the nuclear arsenal, 
the additional fear that he would weaken and perhaps destroy the 
Social Security system, and the continuing emotional impact of the 
Kennedy assassination.2o To hear the voice of the People on the 
single issue of civil rights in these circumstances is, in a phrase of 
Ackerman's, "to play constitutional history backwards." ( 13 7) 
In retrospect, the '64 election can be seen to have been a cru-
cial event in the civil rights revolution of the '60s, leading directly to 
vigorous enforcement of the school desegregation provisions of the 
1964 Civil Rights Act and to the enactment of voting rights and fair 
19. See Ackerman. 99 Yale L. J. at 500-510 (cited in note 8). 
20. For a contemporary account, see Theodore H. White, The Making of the President 
1964. esp. 233-37 and 294-314 (Jonathan Cape, 1965). 
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housing legislation. The election had these consequences, however, 
not because it unambiguously expressed a popular commitment to 
the ideal of racial equality, but because, for reasons largely unre-
lated to civil rights, it strengthened the position of an Administra-
tion and a Congress prepared to act in furtherance of that ideal. 
Public attitudes toward civil rights were, in fact, quite complex, 
which is hardly surprising when one considers the diverse interests 
affected by a comprehensive civil rights program. Equal access to 
public accommodations, employment and housing discrimination, 
affirmative action in employment and higher education, voting 
rights, and public school desegregation might all be considered fac-
ets of a single problem to those most deeply and single-mindedly 
committed to the goal of racial equality, but large segments of the 
public sharply distinguished among them. The complexity and per-
haps the ambivalence of the public response to these and other 
dimensions of the nation's racial problems can be recaptured by re-
calling that 1964 was not only the year in which major civil rights 
legislation was enacted, but also the year in which "backlash" en-
tered our political vocabulary. 
Ackerman comes closer to capturing the process of change 
wrought by the civil rights movement when he writes that "[a]s the 
1950s moved on, this mobilized appeal for racial justice struck 
deepening chords amongst broadening sectors of the citizenry-en-
abling the Presidency and Congress of the mid-1960s finally to [en-
act] the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968 and the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965." (137) (emphasis added) If the election did not ex-
press the People's commitment to achieving racial equality, it did 
furnish evidence of a growing constituency for reform. No less sig-
nificantly, it demonstrated that intense opposition to reform was 
concentrated in a handful of Southern states, and it provided evi-
dence that large segments of the public who were ambivalent about 
the measures necessary to achieve racial equality might not rise up 
in protest against reform because other issues had greater salience 
for them. The President and Congress were thus freed to move for-
ward with reform, beginning not surprisingly with the Voting 
Rights Act, legislation that would enlarge the constituency for re-
form and yet not be perceived as threatening by Northern whites. 
To question Ackerman's account of the 1866 and 1964 elec-
tions is not, obviously, to deny that the 1860s and the 1960s were 
transformative periods in American history. The Civil War fos-
tered a new sense of national identity, a change in public attitudes 
toward the nation symbolized, as every schoolchild knows, by the 
singular pronoun replacing the plural in references to the United 
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States. It profoundly influenced economic life in ways that acceler-
ated the economic integration of the nation.21 The civil rights 
movement, similarly, brought about seismic changes in public atti-
tudes toward relations between blacks and whites and, especially 
with the enactment of the Voting Rights Act, a new political dy-
namic at the federal level in responding to racial issues. The pro-
cess of constitutional change initiated during those periods was, 
however, a good deal more complex than is captured by Acker-
man's conception of "higher lawmaking." In neither is it evident 
that the People laid down, or even approved, principles to guide the 
subsequent course of their government, and in both the subsequent 
conduct of government was significantly shaped by political influ-
ences that were to emerge only thereafter. 
The claim that the People, by their votes in the 1866 election, 
had charted a new constitutional course for their government is es-
pecially puzzling in light of the subsequent history of the amend-
ment. The campaign, after all, was not fought over the issue 
whether some abstraction called the fourteenth amendment should 
be added to the Constitution, but over the nature of Reconstruction 
and the federal government's responsibility for the freedmen. 
Within little more than a decade, however, the amendment fell into 
near desuetude (at least with respect to its animating purpose), 
where it remained for well over a half-century. 
Ackerman obliquely recognizes the importance of this history, 
though not the difficulty it creates for his thesis, when he considers 
Brown v. Board and the civil rights movement "the most successful 
act of popular transformation in recent history" (108) and appar-
ently the only instance of what he regards as "higher lawmaking" 
since the New Deal. Brown, he argues, forced the issue of racial 
equality to the center of the national agenda,22 but it remained an 
"embattled and problematic symbol" until the 1964 Presidential 
election, when the People, in response to the civil rights movement, 
"made a considered judgment about civil rights." (110) The judg-
ment that the civil rights movement produced changes of constitu-
tional significance in American life is, I think, fundamentally sound, 
but it does not sit comfortably with Ackerman's thesis. If his argu-
ments regarding the significance of the 1866 and 1936 elections are 
accepted, adequate constitutional foundations for Brown and the 
civil rights legislation of the 1960s were laid at those times. No 
further decision by the People was required. Yet, to organize con-
21. See Foner, Reconstruction at 18-24 (cited in note 16). 
22. For a contrary view, see Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring 
About Social Change?, esp. ch. 4 (U. Chi. Press, 1991). 
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stitutional history in that way, as Ackerman implicitly recognizes in 
characterizing the civil rights movement as an instance of successful 
"constitutional politics," would ignore nearly a century of history 
and miss the significance of the profound changes that occurred in 
the 1960s. 
The source of these inconsistencies in Ackerman's argument is 
his insistence upon locating constitutional change in a decisive ex-
pression of the People's will at a single election. The Civil War and 
its aftermath, the New Deal, and the civil rights movement were, 
obviously, critical periods in American history, but in attempting to 
codify their meaning, Ackerman falls into the same error as those 
who seek to fix the meaning of the written Constitution by the way 
it was understood at the time of its adoption. The legacy of those 
periods, like the meaning of the written constitution, is importantly 
influenced by the emergence of issues unforeseen at the time, by 
institutional imperatives and commitments in responding to those 
issues, and by the response to those issues by the population in gen-
eral and the political class in particular. Of course, the critical peri-
ods in our history, like the provisions of the written Constitution, 
do exert an influence on subsequent events, an influence that is no 
doubt greater than that exerted on the future by more quiescent 
periods in history. That is why we label them critical. Understand-
ings formed and decisions taken at these times, like the provisions 
of the written Constitution, furnish both a lens through which sub-
sequent generations perceive their problems and the materials from 
which they attempt to fashion solutions for those problems. Noth-
ing in our history, however, supports the view that the decisions 
serve as a blueprint, a set of instructions by which one generation 
binds its successors until such time as one of the latter deliberately 
alters the blueprint. 
Constitutional change, as the post-adoption history of the four-
teenth amendment demonstrates, is the product of a far more fluid, 
complex process than Ackerman's conception of "higher lawmak-
ing" captures. The distinction he draws between "constitutional 
politics" and "normal politics" dichotomizes phenomena more ap-
propriately represented as points along a continuum. Thus, the 
People, in Ackerman's terms, did not exist during the long night of 
civil rights that lasted from 1877 to the 1960s, but it seems hardly 
open to question that a combination of popular attitudes and insti-
tutional forces during the period exerted a shaping influence on the 
racial Constitution of the "middle republic." Other illustrations of 
the point are familiar. A mobilized citizenry did not arise to de-
mand greater sexual freedom, but changing sexual mores-a grow-
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ing belief that sexual life, like debate on public issues, should be 
"uninhibited, robust, and wide-open"23-nonetheless led to sub-
stantial restrictions on governmental power to interfere with sexual 
conduct. A mobilized citizenry did arise to demand that govern-
ment cease discrimination on the basis of sex, but it failed to per-
suade the People, apparently leading Ackerman to regard the effort 
as a failed attempt at "higher lawmaking." Yet, changing societal 
attitudes toward the social role of women yielded constitutional 
limits on sex discrimination that are, at most, only marginally dif-
ferent from those that would have existed if the equal rights amend-
ment had been adopted. 
Ackerman is obviously aware of these and similar develop-
ments, but he regards them as mere interpretations, elaborations of 
the full implications of the People's decisions on the discrete (and 
rare) occasions when they have expressed themselves. It seems 
rather odd, however, to suggest that a constitutional change would 
have resulted from, for example, a decision by the People to adopt 
the equal rights amendment and yet to deny that constitutional 
change has occurred when virtually identical consequences flow 
from Supreme Court decisions. More generally, Ackerman's insis-
tence on locating all constitutional change in a decisive expression 
of the People's will merely reintroduces the same problems encoun-
tered by those who attempt to ground all constitutional decisions in 
the text of the Constitution. His attempt, like theirs, can succeed 
only if the canonical expression is stated at a sufficiently high level 
of abstraction to account for profound changes in the actual prac-
tices of government that occur thereafter.24 Doing so, however, 
sacrifices the point of the project-in Ackerman's case, to establish 
limits on "normal politics" that can meaningfully be attributed to 
the People. 
More significantly, to bring all such changes under the rubric 
of "interpretation" cloaks important issues concerning the assign-
ment of institutional responsibility for responding to social change. 
As our governmental system has evolved, interpretive questions are 
generally regarded as questions to be resolved by courts. Perhaps 
for that reason, arguments characterizing an issue as one calling for 
interpretation often seem driven by a desire to place it in the hands 
of judges. The question of substance, however, is not whether an 
issue can be related to some pre-existing principle or practice by a 
process plausibly regarded as interpretive, but how best to assign 
institutional responsibilities for addressing the issue. 
23. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
24. Not surprisingly, Ackerman makes just that move. See p. 328, infra. 
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Before turning to that question, I want to consider another set 
of issues raised by Ackerman's account of "higher lawmaking." 
Ackerman repeatedly describes the process as characterized by a 
relatively high level of popular deliberation and public-spiritedness. 
Though distinct, the two characteristics are related. "Delibera-
tion," for Ackerman, involves serious consideration of the "rights of 
citizens and the permanent interests of the community," (272) while 
"public spiritedness" entails a willingness to sacrifice private inter-
est to those goals.2s He clearly regards both as important, but it is 
unclear just how they relate to his account of "higher lawmaking." 
At least three possibilities are immediately evident. First, Ack-
erman stresses that "most Americans identify our great popular 
struggles as culminating in the nation's greatest constitutional 
achievements." (19) He may, therefore, intend nothing more than 
historical description: As a nation, we are fortunate that each in-
stance of what he regards as "higher lawmaking" has been marked 
by public-spirited deliberation, a happy but contingent circum-
stance. Alternatively, he may intend a different kind of descriptive 
account, that it is in the nature of public debate that citizens will, by 
participating in it, ultimately be led to set aside their personal inter-
ests and consider the public interest. Finally, he may mean that the 
two characteristics are constitutive of the concept of "higher law-
making," so that whatever the level of popular support for a change 
in the course of government, the People should not be deemed to 
have spoken unless they have exhibited the characteristics in requi-
site measure. 
Each interpretation raises issues that Ackerman fails to con-
front. To the extent that he is engaged in historical description, it is 
perhaps sufficient to observe that he has yet to offer any evidence 
that the instances of what he regards as "higher lawmaking" were, 
in fact, characterized by public-spirited deliberation. But more fun-
damentally, it should be evident that any attempt to make out such 
a case would face formidable, very likely insurmountable, eviden-
tiary difficulties akin to those I have already discussed. Illustra-
tively, even if one interprets the Democrats' massive 1936 electoral 
victory as Ackerman does, as evidencing wide and deep support for 
25. Ackerman's emphasis on deliberation and public-spiritedness reflects the influence 
of renewed interest in civic republicanism, but his treatment of the latter element of republi-
can theory suggests the possibility that he may understand it quite differently from the way in 
which it is conventionally understood. The conventional understanding of civic virtue is that 
it comprises both the sacrifice of private interest involved in participating in public affairs and 
the willingness to sacrifice private interest to the public interest in determining which policies 
to support. Ackerman, however, repeatedly draws attention only to the former. See, e.g., 
236-40 and 270. I am uncertain whether he means to limit the concept in this way, but 
because of the way he defines "deliberation," I assume he does not. 
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an active federal role in the management of the economy, how is 
one to know whether that support was the product of public-spir-
ited deliberation by the electorate? Ackerman acknowledges the 
problem, but, curiously, responds to it by reminding us of the insti-
tutional hurdles that must be surmounted by politicians before they 
earn the right to speak on behalf of the People. (292) The question 
he has put in issue, however, is not whether a reform proposal has 
the support of the electorate, but whether it is supported by a "citi-
zenry that deserves the respect owing to We the People." (291) He 
has, however, yet to suggest what evidence might be brought for-
ward to support such a conclusion. And even if such evidence can 
somehow be adduced, the happy circumstance that we have been 
fortunate in the past is insufficient reason to suppose that we will be 
as lucky in the future. 
We come, thus, to the second interpretation. Whether citizens 
are led to engage in public-spirited deliberation when they enter the 
public realm is an empirical question, but Ackerman offers neither 
supporting evidence nor reasons to believe that they invariably are. 
Participation in public debate does, doubtless, tend to elicit public 
interest arguments, since proponents of a policy are not likely to 
gain support for it if they invoke only their private interests. But 
the arguments may be only a pretext, or largely-though not neces-
sarily consciously-shaped by private interest.26 Instances of what 
Ackerman regards as "higher lawmaking" tend to occur, as he rec-
ognizes, during periods of crisis. Crises do sometimes bring out the 
best in us, but at times they seem to do the opposite. It is, therefore, 
hardly self-evident that the increased popular attention to politics 
during such periods is especially likely to produce public-spirited 
deliberation. 
The last interpretation, though conceptual, ultimately con-
fronts similar evidentiary problems. If the question whether the 
People have spoken turns, in part, on whether they have engaged in 
public-spirited deliberation, how is anyone to know whether that 
condition is satisfied? Moreover, who is to make that determina-
tion? Ackerman rejects the "foundationalist" view that the People's 
decisions are limited by external moral or political principles, but 
subjecting popular decisionmaking to a test of public-spirited delib-
eration comes perilously close to doing just that. Especially because 
26. I have argued elsewhere that motives are generally too complex to be neatly divided 
between those that are public-regarding and those that are selfish. See Terrance Sandalow, 
The Distrust of Politics, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 446, 455 (1981). Ackerman makes the same point 
(251 ), but his argument that civic virtue is enhanced during periods of "constitutional poli-
tics" presumably rests upon the assumption that participation in public debate somehow 
reduces the risks identified in the text. 
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of the evidentiary problems that are presented, a substantial risk 
exists that anyone called upon to determine the quality of public 
deliberation will confuse that question with the question whether 
the public's decision meets the test of some external principle.27 
Questions about the relationship between civic virtue and 
"higher lawmaking" are worth pursuing because the moral force of 
the latter conception-and therefore of "dualist democracy"-de-
pends upon the claim that the People's civic virtue warrants treat-
ing their decisions with a respect not owed to decisions made during 
periods of "normal politics." If decisions made during periods of 
"constitutional politics" are not characterized by a markedly in-
creased measure of public-spirited deliberation, or if there is no way 
of knowing whether they are, the argument for according them spe-
cial status, as "higher law," is greatly weakened. In that event, 
grounds would no longer exist for distinguishing between the hand-
ful of decisions Ackerman attributes to the People and the more 
numerous governmental decisions, during the long periods of "nor-
mal politics," that also enjoy widespread popular support. Absent 
any grounds for such a distinction, there is no apparent reason that 
the former should serve as a measure of the legitimacy of the latter. 
Ackerman's claim that the decisions he attributes to the People 
deserve special respect, as "higher law," is further weakened by 
doubts about whether those decisions can plausibly be regarded as 
"deliberate." Inevitably, he characterizes the principles that emerge 
from the process of "higher lawmaking" at a very high level of ab-
straction-a necessary move if they are to encompass all of the ac-
tual decisions that, over time, will be made in their name. Thus, he 
writes that in the 1866 election the People decisively resolved the 
issue "whether state sovereignty was more important than individ-
ual rights." Thereafter, the only question would be "which individ-
ual rights were sufficiently fundamental to warrant national 
protection." (82) Except in a brief reference to "the nationalistic, 
egalitarian, and libertarian themes of the Reconstruction amend-
ments," (140) he gives no further content to the decisions he attrib-
utes to the People. The constitutional decisions supposedly made 
by the People in approving the New Deal are described at a similar 
level of abstraction: a "repudiation of ... laissez-faire capitalism" 
and an affirmation of an "activist national government" engaged in 
"ongoing bureaucratic intervention in economic and social life." 
(49, 141) 
27. See, e.g., Justice Marshall's dissent in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 232 (1976), 
arguing that public attitudes toward the death penalty would be different if the public were 
better informed. 
1992] ABSTRACT DEMOCRACY 329 
Abstractions such as these may not be meaningless, but such 
meaning as they have is quickly exhausted in any serious considera-
tion of the issues they raise. Even a sophomore would be unlikely 
to escape unscathed were he to announce that individual rights are 
more important than state sovereignty, though he has not yet con-
sidered "which rights are sufficiently fundamental to warrant na-
tional protection." Or, without more, that he favors an "activist 
national government." Judgments such as these, to the extent that 
they have any content, do not gain our respect because they seem to 
involve neither an assessment of consequences nor a consideration 
of alternatives and-perhaps for those reasons-because they seem 
to resolve so little. 
In the presence of these doubts about whether the decisions 
Ackerman attributes to the People are (or can be shown to be) the 
product of public-spirited deliberation-or even whether they can 
meaningfully be regarded as deliberate-there is little reason for 
confidence that the process of "higher lawmaking" he describes can 
safely be entrusted with the important responsibility of defining 
"the rights of citizens and the permanent interests of the commu-
nity." The contrast with Article Vis instructive. Independent ex-
amination of a proposed constitutional amendment by the multiple 
legislative bodies whose approval is required by that article is cer-
tain to provide a far more focused, reflective consideration of the 
issues than the People are capable of undertaking. Of at least equal 
importance, the national consensus required to achieve approval by 
those bodies offers significant assurance that-whether or not the 
participants are public-spirited-the interests of the entire popula-
tion will have been taken into account. Neither objective is served 
very well by the process of "higher lawmaking" Ackerman 
describes. 
To summarize: Ackerman's account of the role of the People 
in "higher lawmaking" confronts at least three major problems. 
First, it is doubtful that the People made, or can be shown to have 
made, the decisions he attributes to them. Second, even if that hur-
dle can somehow be overcome, the process of "higher lawmaking," 
as he describes it, appears inadequate to bear the weighty responsi-
bility assigned to it in his "dualist democracy." Third, and perhaps 
most significantly, Ackerman's effort to locate all constitutional 
change in decisive expressions of the People's will on rare and dis-
crete occasions fails to capture the reality of constitutional change 
and thereby cloaks important questions that arise during periods of 
so-called "normal politics," questions that concern the appropriate 
sources of constitutional judgment and the assignment of institu-
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tional responsibility for dealing with social change. I tum now to 
the bearing of Ackerman's thesis on those questions. 
IV 
Ackerman, it will be recalled, maintains that the Supreme 
Court serves a "preservationist function," protecting "the higher 
law solutions reached by the People against their erosion during pe-
riods of normal politics." ( 60) Of course, if the People did not make 
the decisions he attributes to them, or if they cannot be shown to 
have done so, there is nothing for the Court to preserve. Although I 
think that difficulty alone is likely to prove fatal to his argument 
concerning the Court's role, I propose to proceed on the contrary 
assumption, giving full weight to his description of those decisions, 
in order to explore other issues raised by his thesis. 
On the surface, Ackerman advances a conception of the Con-
stitution that differs markedly from the one that has dominated aca-
demic discussion during the past generation. As evidenced by their 
emphasis on rights and their concern for protecting the interests of 
minorities, most academic commentators in recent years have con-
ceived of the Constitution primarily as an instrument for limiting 
the power of overbearing majorities. Ackerman, in contrast, insists 
that the Constitution must be grounded in popular consent. Rather 
than an instrument for controlling majorities, it is, in his view, the 
People's instrument for controlling their government. The protec-
tion of rights and of minority interests is, he acknowledges, an im-
portant function of constitutional law but, he maintains, the 
"Constitution is democratic first, rights-protecting second": 
"[J]udicial protection of rights [depends] on a prior democratic af-
firmation" of those rights. (13) 
Taken at face value, this aspect of Ackerman's thesis is one of 
its most attractive features, in part because of its continuity with 
ideas prevalent at the time the Constitution was adopted, but more 
fundamentally because it recognizes the nation's continuing demo-
cratic commitments. Given those commitments, no other source of 
authority is available to legitimate the Constitution. It seems to fol-
low, as a corollary of the proposition that the Constitution's legiti-
macy depends on popular consent, that if constitutional law is to 
evolve over time-as our history demonstrates it will-the changes 
must have a purchase on values reasonably attributable to the soci-
ety. Of course, to call attention to the corollary is not to furnish 
answers to questions about the appropriate content of constitutional 
law, but to pose a series of problems. American society is not mon-
olithic. How are values attributable to "the society" to be distilled 
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from the discordant voices by which it is constituted? Moreover, 
just as an individual's values are not revealed by every momentary 
inclination, societal values are not determined by every majoritarian 
impulse. How, then, are transitory expressions of majority will to 
be distinguished from the more reflective, enduring beliefs that we 
have in mind when we refer to "values?" The overarching diffi-
culty, as I put it some years ago, is that societal values "are not a 
'brooding omnipresence' merely awaiting discovery by a sufficiently 
keen observer. They must be constructed and, inevitably, their con-
struction must be effected through some process."2s The central 
problem of constitutional theory, accordingly, is to define and jus-
tify a process for constructing the societal values to be expressed 
through constitutional law. 
From this perspective, Ackerman's thesis reveals rather less of 
a commitment to democratic values than his argument about the 
People's role in "higher lawmaking" might lead one to expect. De-
spite his claim that he means to shift attention away from the 
Supreme Court, toward other actors on the constitutional stage, the 
Court, in his "dualist democracy," continues in a starring role. In 
the end, responsibility for determining the shape and direction of 
constitutional law does not rest with the People-and surely not 
with the (more mundane and, therefore, lower case) people and 
their elected representatives-but with the Justices. Although Ack-
erman does not purport to cast the Court in so dominant a role, its 
presence at center stage, with other actors relegated to at most sup-
porting parts, is a necessary consequence of the way in which the 
various roles are structured. Actors other than the Court-the elec-
torate and its representatives-appear only during the infrequent 
episodes of "constitutional politics." Decisions taken by them dur-
ing the long intervals of "normal politics" are regarded as irrelevant 
to the content of constitutional law. At such times, the Court is the 
only player on the constitutional stage. 
Since the Court's democratic credentials are not especially im-
pressive, Ackerman's claim that the Constitution is "democratic 
first" rests entirely on his argument that the Justices are only elabo-
rating decisions by the People on the occasions when the latter have 
spoken. Yet, given the character and infrequency of those deci-
sions, the contention that the Court is merely pursuing a course set 
by the People seems implausible, serving mainly to cloak the impor-
tant choices that must be made if those "decisions" are to be given 
any meaningful content. The People have simply decided too little 
28. Terrance Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities. 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1162 1185 (1977). ' 
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to nourish judicial judgment on the issues that arise during the long 
periods of "normal politics."29 A closer look at Ackerman's argu-
ment will reveal just how large a role he has fashioned for the 
Court-and how little, on his account, its decisions owe to prior 
decisions by the People. 
Ackerman approaches issues of constitutional interpretation by 
way of what he calls "the problem of multigenerational synthesis." 
(88) The problem arises in this way. During the early republic, the 
task of constitutional interpretation, though not free of difficulty, 
was relatively straightforward, "[to elaborate] the constitutional 
principles" approved by the founding generation. (88) With the 
adoption of the Reconstruction amendments, and especially the 
fourteenth amendment, the task became considerably more com-
plex. Unlike, say, the eleventh and twelfth amendments, they did 
not address narrow, well defined issues. Rather, Ackerman main-
tains, they altered a fundamental premise of the original Constitu-
tion. At the same time, they did not represent a comprehensive 
repudiation of the existing governmental system, like that which oc-
curred when the Constitution replaced the Articles of Confedera-
tion. The interpretive problem, accordingly, was to determine how 
much of the constitutional landscape the People had altered, a prob-
lem whose difficulty was compounded by the fact that the "legal 
premises and social life" of the "Republican world of the nineteenth 
century was very different from the Federalist world of the eight-
eenth." (89) The constitutional transformation wrought by the 
People during the New Deal adds to the complexity of the interpre-
tive problem. Once again, the People did not approve an entirely 
new constitutional order, but they did demand a change in some of 
the fundamental premises of the old order. The problem is "[h]ow 
to put together a constitutional whole out of such discordant parts," 
how to "reconcile ... the disparate historical achievements of the 
American people." (89, 160) 
In a democracy, one might suppose, a problem of that magni-
tude would be understood as the continuing responsibility of the 
entire political system. Especially because of the open-ended char-
acter of the decisions Ackerman attributes to the People, represent-
atives accountable to the citizenry might be expected to play an 
important, though not necessarily an exclusive, role. In Acker-
man's "dualist democracy," however, responsibility for addressing 
the problem rests exclusively with the Supreme Court. It alone is 
empowered to make all of the mid-level decisions that are required 
to translate the abstractions he attributes to the People into princi-
29. See p. 328, supra. 
1992] ABSTRACT DEMOCRACY 333 
pies of sufficiently determinate content to guide the operations of 
government.Jo The breadth of the choices left open for the Court is 
illustrated by Ackerman's discussion of Lochner v. New York and 
Griswold v. Connecticut, both of which he regards as having been 
correctly decided. 
Lochner, Ackerman argues, was a justifiable synthesis of the 
original Constitution and the fourteenth amendment. The latter, it 
will be recalled, he regards as expressing the People's decision that 
the federal government should henceforth be responsible for safe-
guarding fundamental rights from infringement by the states. The 
Court's decision that "freedom of contract" was sufficiently funda-
mental to warrant national protection, Ackerman maintains, merely 
recognized the "high constitutional value" that the "Founding Fed-
eralists placed [on] market freedom."JI (116) "This constitutional 
understanding," he continues, "was reinforced by the Reconstruc-
tion amendments." (100) The thirteenth amendment, for example, 
"was understood, first and foremost, in legal terms that relied on 
the language of ... contract. At a minimum, it meant that blacks 
... could freely contract for their labor." (Id.) Since slavery and 
freedom were in large part distinguished by freedom of contract, he 
concludes, legislation depriving individuals of their right freely to 
contract regarding the term of their labor might reasonably have 
been understood as "a kind of slavery." (ld.) 
In the most charitable terms I can muster, Ackerman's defense 
of Lochner fails, utterly and completely. To begin with, if the fram-
30. Despite my disagreement with the way he employs the idea, in one important re-
spect I regard Ackerman's discussion of "multigenerational synthesis" as a significant contri-
bution to the literature. An amendment, by definition, alters existing law and, therefore, 
almost inevitably raises questions about the extent to which the latter has been displaced. 
The extent of the displacement has conventionally been understood to be limited to the terms 
of the amendment. Ackerman makes a deeper point, that some constitutional amendments 
(or "amendments") alter a fundamental premise of the existing constitutional structure and, 
therefore, have force beyond their terms. 
Illustratively, in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. I (1989), the Court confronted 
the question whether Congress, acting under the commerce clause, was empowered to abro-
gate a state's eleventh amendment immunity. Justice Scalia, in dissent, woodenly sought to 
distinguish an earlier case sustaining such a power under the fourteenth amendment on the 
ground that it dealt only with an amendment adopted after the eleventh and was, thus, irrele-
vant to the question of congressional power under the commerce clause. Ackerman's argu-
ment might have led Justice Scalia to understand that chronology does not determine the 
issue. The underlying question, common to the commerce clause and the fourteenth amend-
ment, is whether in light of the fundamental changes in the premises of the federal system 
that have occurred during the past century, the states should be permitted to assert an elev-
enth amendment immunity against Congress. 
31. Elsewhere, Ackerman writes that "[t]he Founders valued contract so highly that 
they protected it in the original 1787 Constitution." (152) And, at yet another point, "[e]ven 
during the early republic, the courts had marked out contract as a domain of freedom pecu-
liarly appropriate for national protection." (I 00) 
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ers and the courts of the early republic put a "high constitutional 
value" on freedom of contract, they had a curious way of showing 
it. Article I, section l~the only mention of contract in the Con-
stitution-protected only reliance interests, not freedom from gov-
ernmental regulation of the terms of contract. Nor did the courts of 
the early republic extend the protection any further.32 Ackerman's 
attempt to draw upon the Constitution of the early republic as a 
justification for Lochner rests, quite simply, upon a fundamental 
misconception regarding the meaning of the contract clause and the 
uses to which it was put by the courts. His reliance on the thir-
teenth amendment, though not marked by a similar error, is no 
more persuasive. Even if one were to concede some points of simi-
larity, slavery is manifestly a different phenomenon from the restric-
tions on laborers imposed by maximum hour or minimum wage 
legislation. The question whether the similarities or the differences 
are of greater importance poses significant issues of morality and 
public policy, issues surely not addressed by the People when the 
thirteenth amendment was adopted. Ackerman's analysis leaves 
the resolution of those issues entirely to the Court, but he suggests 
neither sources of judgment upon which it might appropriately have 
drawn in deciding those issues nor reasons for concluding that they 
were more appropriately decided by the Court than by the New 
York legislature. 
Ackerman's defense of Griswold encounters similar difficulties. 
As he analyzes the case, the interpretive problem it presented was 
how to reconcile "the Founding's concern with individual freedom 
and the New Deal's affirmation of activist government." (152) 
From 1787 to the New Deal, he maintains, "property and contract 
were fundamental to the constitutional language of liberty." (ld.) 
After the People's repudiation of /aissez-faire during the New Deal, 
however, liberty could no longer be understood in those terms. 
"This left the modern Court with a formidable problem. Given 
New Deal activism, what remained of the Founding values of indi-
vidual self-determination formerly expressed in the language of 
property and contract?" (ld.) The Court's achievement in Griswold, 
he contends, was to recognize that areas of constitutionally pro-
tected freedom-areas captured by "the idea of privacy" -survived 
the New Deal. Rejecting "particularistic efforts to look upon the 
Bill of Rights as a series of disjointed rules," the Court viewed "the 
32. The Dartmouth College case, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819), which Ackerman cites 
in support of his claim that the courts of the early republic "had marked out contract as a 
domain of freedom peculiarly appropriate for national protection," rai~ on!y the very dif-
ferent question whether a royal charter was a contract protected agamst Impairment by Arti-
cle I, section 10. 
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rules as expressive of more abstract Founding values-values that 
retain their constitutional meaning despite the transformations and 
contingencies of two centuries." (156) 
Various objections might be raised to this defense of Griswold, 
but I want to focus on only one. Accepting Ackerman's argument 
that the Court was right to abstract from the Bill of Rights a more 
general constitutional commitment to individual freedom, a ques-
tion remains whether that freedom encompasses the sexual freedom 
protected by Griswold and its progeny. Just as in his defense of 
Lochner, Ackerman leaves that question entirely to the Court, with 
no indication of the sources to which the Court might look to in-
form its judgment. Within the framework of his thesis, the only 
resources available to the Court, apart from its own prior decisions, 
are the People's judgments on the rare occasions when they have 
spoken. But those judgments are manifestly too thin to inform the 
Court's judgment on the question whether and to what extent sex-
ual activity-or any other activity for which immunity from regula-
tion is claimed-is within the area of constitutionally protected 
freedom. Prior judicial decisions may in some instances-though 
surely not in Griswold-help to fill the void, but the need to rely on 
precedent for that purpose merely drives home the point that in 
Ackerman's "dualist democracy" it is the Justices, not the People, 
who make the crucial constitutional decisions. 
In practical effect, therefore, Ackerman's thesis differs little 
from theories advanced during the past generation by other com-
mentators who, under the sway of the Warren Court, have sought 
to vest in judges responsibility for determining large and controver-
sial areas of public policy. The role he assigns the Court cannot, 
however, be squared with the democratic aspirations of his thesis. 
A serious commitment to the idea that the Constitution should be 
"democratic first" requires attention to sources of judicial judgment 
that are both richer than those provided by Ackerman's thesis and 
more realistically grounded in popular consent. 
On Ackerman's analysis, the Court's decision in Griswold owes 
nothing to changing sexual mores or to the increasing importance 
the twentieth century has placed upon sexual expression as central 
to individual identity. Surely, however, Griswold and the decisions 
that followed in its wake cannot be understood apart from those 
changes. To see the issue in Griswold in this perspective is to raise 
in limine the question of institutional responsibility for responding 
to the changes. Why, to put the question bluntly, was the issue of 
whether Connecticut's "uncommonly silly law"33 should be put to 
33. 381 U.S. 479, 527 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
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rest one for the Supreme Court rather than for the Connecticut leg-
islature? The beginnings of an answer are to be found in the federal 
government's assumption of authority to define and protect funda-
mental rights, authority that owes a good deal less to decisions by 
the People in 1866 and 1936 than to the increasing social and eco-
nomic integration of the nation over the course of the twentieth cen-
tury and the steady accretion of federal power during the same 
period. Although the states continue to have important decision-
making responsibilities, it has increasingly come to be accepted 
"that they-like administrative agencies or local governments-
must act within the framework of norms that the larger society re-
gards as fundamental, norms that are to be given legal expression by 
the institutions of the national government. "34 
The question remains whether the Court was justified in con-
cluding that the Connecticut statute prohibiting the use of contra-
ceptives violated such a norm. It is tempting to say that the answer 
to that question, especially in the limited context in which the ques-
tion was presented, is too obvious to warrant discussion, but more 
was available to the Court than its ability to apprehend societal 
norms directly. The belief that consensual (heterosexual) sexual 
conduct is not a legitimate concern of government was reflected in 
the increasing number of states that had repealed restrictions on 
such conduct and the virtual desuetude of such restrictions in those 
jurisdictions in which they remained on the books. Of more imme-
diate relevance, as Justice Harlan observed in Poe v. Ullman, was 
the "utter novelty" of the Connecticut statute:3s No other state at-
tempted to prohibit the use of contraceptives and few sought even 
to regulate their distribution, except in the interest of health. In 
these circumstances, surely, the Court was justified in concluding 
that American society had achieved a consensus that required inval-
idation of the Connecticut legislation. 
This view of Griswold illustrates a more general point, that a 
good deal of legislation enacted during periods of so-called "normal 
politics" can serve as an important source of constitutional judg-
ment, one that would permit the Court to ground the evolving con-
tent of constitutional law in decisions that may reasonably be 
understood as expressing contemporary societal values. When, to 
take another example, some three dozen states responded to the de-
cision in Furman v. Georgia by reenacting the death penalty, the 
question of contemporary societal attitudes toward capital punish-
34. Terrance Sandalow, Federalism and Social Change, 43 L. & Con temp. Prob. 29, 33-
34 (Summer 1980). 
35. 367 U.S. 497, 554 (1961) (dissenting opinion). 
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ment was pretty well put to rest. A mobilized citizenry did not 
arise to demand either greater sexual freedom or the reinstatement 
of the death penalty. Societal values were expressed, rather, in the 
only way they can be in a working democracy, through the deliber-
ate, broadly based decisions of representative institutions accounta-
ble to the citizenry.36 
By denying the Court access to such decisions, Ackerman 
strips it of the one resource that would allow it to claim democratic 
legitimacy for its judgments. More significantly, by denying the rel-
evance of those decisions to constitutional judgment, he deprives 
representative institutions of any meaningful role in determining the 
values to be expressed through constitutional law. The exclusion of 
representative institutions from any part in that project might not 
represent a serious threat to democratic values if the Constitution 
were interpreted very restrictively, as imposing few limits on the 
operation of government, but that is not Ackerman's reading. As 
illustrated by his discussion of Lochner and Griswold, he reads the 
Constitution and the People's judgments capaciously, as expressing 
the abstract values that, in his view, lie behind their particulars. If 
the Constitution is to be understood in that way, sources of consti-
tutional judgment are necessary that will, as Alexander Bickel once 
wrote, "securely limit as well as nourish"37 those judgments. The 
sources available to the Court in a "dualist democracy" would do 
neither. 
36. The argument that lies behind this assertion is more fully, though still sketchily, set 
out in Sandalow, 75 Mich. L. Rev. at 1183-95 (cited in note 28) and Sandalow, Racial Prefer-
ences in Higher Education: Political Responsibility and the Judicial Role, 42 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
653, 693-703 (1975). I expect to develop it more fully in work in progress. 
37. Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Coun and the Idea of Progress 34 (Harper & 
Row, 1970). 
